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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15566 
KENNETH M. FORSHEE, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft 
by deception, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405(1) (Supp. 1977), in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried without a jury on 
November 2, 1977. Judge Croft found the appellant guilty 
of theft by deception under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(Supp. 1977), and sentenced him to an indeterminate term 
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. The 
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execution of the sentence was stayed, and the defendant was 
placed on two years probation and fined $1,000. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the conviction 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
l'lr. and l'lrs. James Smith, the complainants, purchasecl 
a used car from the appellant, Kenneth Forshee, Jr., on or 
about November 5, 1976 (T.ll). They first looked at the car 
on November 3, 1976, on the appellant's used car lot (T.7), 
and on that occasion, the appellant indicated that the car 
had been recently repainted and that the mileage on the 
odometer, approximately 33,800 miles, was correct (T.9). 
The complainants were looking specifically for a 1973 Monte 
Carlo (T.31), that would be dependable enough to allow Mr. 
Smith to leave the state to find work (T.9). The Smiths 
returned to the lot on the next day (T.lO), and made a 
down payment on the car. The defendant again represented 
the mileage on the car to be accurate (T.lO). On November 
9, 1976, the Smiths paid the balance due on the car to Mr. 
Forshee (T.l3). The total sales price was $2,830 plus taxes. 
On March 21, 1977, while cleaning out the Monte 
Carlo, Mr. Smith discovered a lubrication sticker on the 
-2-
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door frame that had been covered up when the car had been 
repainted (T.l3). The lubrication sticker indicated 
mileage in excess of 80,000 miles (T.l4). After making 
several phone calls to various governmental agencies, 
Mr. Smith spoke to John McKnight of the Utah Division of 
Motor Vehicles (T.lS). Mr. McKnight examined the car at 
the State Fairgrounds that same day (T.l6). 
On March 22, 1977, the appellant called the 
Smiths at home and asked them to come into his office to 
discuss the car (T.l6). The appellant made several offers 
to appease the Smiths in an effort to enlist their help in 
getting the State "off his back" (T.l7,18,20). 
Evidence was offered to show that the defendant 
purchased the car from the Salt Lake Auto Auction for 
$1850 (T.93), and at that time the car had approximately 
73,000 miles on it (T.92). 
Mr. Smith testified that although his wife liked 
the car at the time they discovered the odometer had been 
tampered with (T.30), that he would not have purchased the 
vehicle had he known that the 33,800 miles indicated on the 
odometer was inaccurate (T.20). 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH ODOMETER STATUTES, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
41-6-176, ET SEQ. (SUPP. 1977), AND THE THEFT 
BY DECEPTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (SUPP. 
1977), ARE NOT DUPLICATIVE, AND THE APPELLANT WAS 
PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 76-6-405. 
On page 3 of his brief, the appellant asserts 
that "it is a general rule of statutory construction 
that where two statutes treat the same subject matter, 
the one general and the other specific in its provisions, 
the specific provision controls." 
While this is undoubtedly the rule in Utah, the 
appellant has assumed the fact that two statutes, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (Supp. 1977), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-6-176, et seq. (Supp. 1977), are duplicative. This 
assumption is incorrect. 
Section 76-6-405(1), provides that "A person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." 
Section 41-6-177, provides: 
"It shall be unlawful to do 
any of the following acts with 
respect to the operation of an 
odometer in any motor vehicle: 
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(l) For any person to 
disconnect, turn back, or reset 
the odometer of any motor 
vehicle with the intent to 
reduce the true number of miles 
indicated upon the odometer gauge. 
(2) For any person, with 
intent to defraud, to operate a 
motor vehicle on any street or 
highway knowing that the odometer 
of the vehicle is disconnected or 
nonfunctional. 
(3) For any person to advertise 
for sale, to sell, to use, or to 
install on any part of a motor vehicle 
or on an odometer in a motor vehicle 
any device which causes the odometer 
to register any mileage othAr than 
the true mileage driven. For the 
purposes of this act the true mileage 
driven is the mileage driven by the 
car as registered by the odometer within 
the manufacturer's designed tolerance." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In short, the appellant contends that since he 
could have been charged under Section 41-6-177(1), which is 
a misdemeanor, he cannot be convicted for the subsequent 
act of selling the automobile under Section 76-6-405(1), 
which constitutes a felony. 
The statutes on their face clearly are not 
duplicative. They deal with different subject matter and 
contain different elements of criminality. The odometer 
statute proscribes only the disconnecting, turning back, 
or resetting of an odometer, or the operation of a vehicle 
knowing the odometer to be inoperative with an intent to 
defraud. No mention is made of the subsequent sale of the 
-5-
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auto in the statute, and the violation is complete as 
soon as the tampering has occurred. On the other 
hand, Section 76-6-405, addresses itself to the situation 
that arises when a subsequent sale of the vehicle is 
made. In fact, it goes beyond the odometer statutes and 
requires additional elements of proof to sustain a 
conviction. While it is true that the appellant could 
have been charged with a violation of both offenses 
contained in two statutes, the statutes are not 
duplicative. People v. Ross, 25 Cal.App.3d 190, 100 
Cal.Rptr. 703 (1972). 
In State v. Harlan, 116 N.H. 598, 364 A.2d 1254 
(1976), the court addressed the identical issue on the 
same facts presented in this case. The defendants in 
Harlan, supra, were found guilty of both theft by decep-
tion and tampering with an odometer. The court concluded: 
"An examination of the statutes 
reveals that the elements of each 
crime differ materially despite the 
fact that the operative facts on 
which the State relies in the present 
indictments may also constitute an 
offense under R.S.A. 260 · 91, :92 
[the tampering statute).i The critical 
1 "260:91 Misrepresentation and Certification of Mileage. M 
person who changes, tampers with or defaces, or who attempt 
to change, tamper with or deface, any gauge, dial, or other 
mechanical instrument, commonly known as an odometer or an 
hour meter in a motor vehicle, highway building appliance, 
(continued on next page) 
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difference lies in the fact that 
R.S.A. 637:42 [theft by deception] 
requires a finding that the defendant 
unlawfully converted the property of 
another to his own use, an element 
wholly lacking under R.S.A. 260:91. 
The statutes are neither inconsistent 
nor duplications in that regard. 
Tampering with an odometer with the 
intent to deceive a prospective pur-
chaser may well be preparatory to the 
commission of the more serious offense 
of theft by deception. It does not 
follow that the State is precluded from 
charging the greater simply because it 
might have charged the lesser ••• The 
offenses are not the same in law and in 
fact and thus these indictments do not 
raise the specter of abuse of prosecu-
torial discretion." 364 A.2d at 1258. 
1 (continued) snowmobile or boat, which, under normal circum-
stances and without being changed, tampered with or defaced, 
is designed to show by numbers or words the distance which the 
motor vehicle, highway building appliance, snowmobile or boat 
has traveled or the use sustained with the intention of mis-
representing to a prospective or eventual purchaser the number 
of miles traveled or the use sustained by said motor vehicle, 
highway building appliance, snowmobile or boat, shall be 
punished pursuant to the provisions of RSA 260:92. Actual 
mileage will be certified by the previous owner to the best 
of his knowledge at the time of sale, trade or other type of 
transaction resulting in an assignment of title of the vehicle 
by an entry on the certificate of title or the application for 
a title if a certificate of title is required, or if no certifi-
cate of title is required by a notarized statement by the seller. 
"260:92 Penalty. Any person who violates the provisions 
of RSA 260:91 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor for the first 
offense, and for a subsequent offense, guilty of a class B felon~ 
if a natural person, or guilty of a felony if any other person." 
New Hampshire Revised Stat. Annotated, 1955, as amended. 
2 "637:4 Theft by Deception. 1. A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." New 
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, 1955, as amended" 
-7-
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The New Hampshire court continued, saying that "Since 
the one statute does not mirror the other, the State 
is free to proceed under either or both, cognizant of 
its greater burden under R.S.A. 637:4." 
A similar result was reached in State v. 
Waldenburg, 9 Wash.App. 529, 513 P.2d 577 (1973), 
in which the court noted the different elements in the 
larceny statute, under which the defendant was convicted, 
and the tampering statute. 
In his brief, at page 5, appellant asserts 
that since the legislature has decreed the act of 
tampering with the odometer to be a misdemeanor in 
legislation enacted subsequent to Section 76-6-405, it has 
considered and rejected the idea that a violator of 
Section 41-6-176, et seq., can be prosecuted under Section 
76-6-405. Once again, the appellant overlooks the doctrine 
that if a statute can be determined from the plain meaning 
of the words used, the courts may not go further and apply 
any other means of interpretation. Montana Assn. of Tobacco 
and Candy Distr. v. State Board of Equalization, 476 P.2d 
775 (Mont. 1970). See also, Comment, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 Univ. 
Colordao Law Review, 455, 1971. 
-8-
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Even if the intent expressed by the legislature 
in enacting the odometer statutes is considered, it 
indicates no more than a desire to proscribe that which 
is unambiguously stated, and does not discuss the act of 
selling the vehicle after the violation occurs. In People 
v. Ross, supra, the court addressed an issue very similar 
to the one in this case, and concluded that the mere 
enactment of the odometer statute did not manifest the 
legislature's intent that the odometer statute would 
preclude prosecutions for theft by false pretenses. 100 
Cal.R. at 705. See 76 A.L.R.3d 999. 
State v. Kliewer, 210 Kan. 820, 504 P.2d 580 
(1972), relied on by the appellant (page 5 of appellant's 
brief) is distinguishable in that the two statutes 
addressed themselves to virtually the same subject matter. 3 
3 "21-4403. Deceptive commercial practices. (1) A 
deceptive commercial practice is the act, use or 
employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false 
pretense, false promise, or knowing misrepresentation of 
a material fact, with the intent that others shall rely 
thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, 
whether or not any person has in fact been misled, 
deceived, or damaged thereby. (2) ••. (c) 'Sale' means 
any sale, offer for sale, or attempt to sell any 
merchandise for any consideration •.• (4) A deceptive 
commercial practice is a class B misdemeanor. [L. 1969, 
ch. 180, § 21-4403; July 1, 1970.)" 
"8-611. Odometers, tachometers and other devices 
registering mileage; unlawful acts; penalties. (a) It 
shall be unlawful for any person to sell or convey a 
(continued on next page) 
-9-
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The more general statute, under which Kliewer was 
convicted, dealt with deceptive representations in the 
sale of merchandise, and the Kansas court found that 
statute and the odometer statute to be in conflict. 
3 (continued) motor vehicle knowing that the odometer, 
tachometer or any other device used for registering 
the mileage or use of such motor vehicle has been 
disconnected, turned back, reset, replaced or made 
inonerative with the intent and for the purpose of 
defrauJing a purchaser. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to 
disconnect, turn back, reset or replace the odometer, 
tachometer or any other device used for registering the 
mileage or use of motor vehicles with the intent to 
reduce the number of miles or use thereof indicated on 
such gauge or device. The provisions of this section 
shall not apply to any of the following: 
(l) The disconnecting of the odometer, tach-
ometer or any other device used for registering the 
mileage or use of new motor vehicles being tested by the 
manufacturer prior to the delivery to a dealer. 
(2) Replacement of a damaged or broken odometer, 
tachometer or other device used for registering the 
mileage or use of a motor vehicle with a new one when 
such new gauge or device registers 'O' miles or use. 
(c) The term 'motor vehicle' as used in this 
section shall mean every vehicle which is self-propelled 
except aircraft. 
(d) The term 'person' as used in this section 
shall mean an individual, partnership, corporation or 
association. 
(e) Any person violating the provisions of this 
act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not 
to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by confinerne~ 
in the county jail for a period not to exceed six (6) 
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. [L. 
1969, ch. 50, § l, July 1.]" Kansas Statutes Annotated. 
-10-
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In summary, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-176, et. 
seq., and § 76-6-405, are not duplicative. Section 
76-6-405 requires the State to prove the additional 
element that the accused obtained control over the 
property of another with the intent to deprive him 
thereof. Because they are not duplicative, the 
appellant's argument that since the odometer statute 
is more specific, it should apply, is inapplicable 
since that rule of statutory construction is not to be 
applied unless the statutes are duplicative or not 
distinguishable based upon their plain meaning. 
POINT II 
THE COMPLAINANT INCURRED A PECUNIARY LOSS 
IN EXCESS OF $1,000. 
The elements required to be proven by the 
State in a prosecution for theft by deception have been 
advanced by this Court on numerous occasions. 
"The necessary elements of 
this offense are (l) a false or 
fraudulent representation (2) made 
knowing it to be such (3) with 
intent to cheat or defraud the 
person to whom the representation 
was made; (4) an actual fraud must 
have been perpetrated in the sense 
that something of value was 
obtained and the victim lost some-
thing of value, and (5) the 
representation must have induced 
-11-
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the owner to part with his property 
in the sense that the owner parted 
with his property in reliance upon 
the truth of the representation." 
State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244, 
351 P.2d 96 at 97 (1960). 
These elements are essentially the same as 
this Court enumerated in the earlier cases of State v. 
Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 Pac. 628 (1920), and State v. 
Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38 P.2d 1097 (1934). 
In 0ddition to the above ele~ents, the Utah 
court has requ1red that the victim sustain a "pecuniary 
or property loss by reason of the transaction relied 
upon." Morris, supra, 38 P.2d at 1100. But to this 
requirement, the following caveat exists: 
the actual fraud and 
prejudice .• is deter~ined 
according to the situation of the 
victim immediately after he parts 
with his property. If he gets what 
was pretended and what he bargained 
for, there is no fraud or prejudice." 
38 P.2d at 1099. 
See also State v. Fisher, 70 Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589 at 
590 (1932). 
Mr. Forshee asserts that since the complainant 
received an automobile that he later came to like for a 
price less than the fair market value of the car, he 
has not sustained a pecuniary loss. This argument 
attempts to prove too much, and ignores entirely the 
fact that the buyer would never have purchased the 
-12-
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product had accurate representations been made. In the 
instant case, the complainant parted with $2,830 and 
received in return a car that had more than twice as 
many miles as the odometer indicated. 
State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 Pac. 294 
(1927), and Morris, supra, are readily distinguishable 
from the case at bar. In Casperson, supra, the Court 
based its decision on the "innocent purchaser" theory, 
and held that where the defendant was allowed to retain 
title on cars financed by an independent party, that 
his subsequent representation that he held title was 
valid, and that the third party received what it intended, 
i.e., an obligation for payments on an auto whose title 
was held by the defendant. In Morris, supra, the Court 
concluded that the finance company received what it 
bargained for, a right to receive payments based on a 
sales contract. It stated that, "in all probability 
it [the complaining corporation) did not and will not 
sustain any loss." 
One issue presented by this appeal is how is 
the victim's loss to be determined. The respondent has 
been unable to find any Utah cases that address this 
specific point. However, two recent California decisions 
-13-
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do discuss these issues. In People v. Hess, 10 Cal.A.3d 
1071, 90 Cal.R. 268 (1970), the victim purchased a horse 
he was led to believe was Ingaia, a full-blooded Arabian 
mare worth over $3,000. The victim had agreed to pay 
$1,000 for the animal, and at the time of trial he had 
actually paid $550. The horse purchased was shown to be 
worth only about $150 to $200. The court stated: 
"If the representation 
was knowingly made, the theft 
was of $550 and constituted 
grand theft. If the represen-
tation was innocently made, no 
crime at all was committed. 
Under no circumstance were 
appellants entitled to offset 
the value of the spurious animal 
used to accomplish the fraud 
against the sum obtained from 
the victims to reduce the crime 
to petty theft." 90 Cal.R. at 
273. 
In People v. Ross, supra, the court addressed the 
same issue, and said: "As to the matter of the degree of 
the theft, the defendant erroneously argues that the test is 
ultimate loss rather than the amount of money received by 
the accused." 100 Cal.R. at 706. The Ross case is similar 
to the instant case in that the defendant was convicted 
for turning back odometers and subsequently selling them. 
Hess and Ross are valuable precedent for at least 
two reasons. First of all, the California statute dealing 
with theft by deception requires the sam0 elements of proof 
-14-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as Section 76-6-405. See West's Annotated California 
Codes, Volume 49, § 484, note 393; and People v. Brady, 
80 Cal.R. 418 (1969). Secondly, these decisions appear 
to be the only cases that specifically address the issue 
presented here. 
The appellant argues that a decision by this 
Court that follows the Ross rationale would necessitate 
overruling Casperson, supra, and Morris, supra. This is 
not the case, since neither Casperson nor Morris address 
the issue presented here. Indeed, the Court's statement 
in Casperson that it is the situation of the victim 
immediately after he parts with his property that is 
determinative, is supportive of the theory advanced in 
both Ross and Hess. 
In his conclusion, the appellant makes a further 
attempt to point out reasons that this court should reject 
Hess and Ross. The appellant asserts at page 18 of his 
brief that the California cases would not have resulted 
in a conviction if the defendant had remained silent about 
the altered odometers. There is nothing in either case to 
support this conclusion. In any event, Section 76-6-401(5), 
clearly precludes this result in Utah: 
-15-
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"(5) 'Deception' occurs 
when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by 
words or conduct an impression 
of law or fact that is false and 
that the actor does not believe 
to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction; or 
{b) Fails to correct a false 
impression of law or fact that the 
actor previously created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and 
that the actor does not now believe 
to be true •.•• " 
In addition, this Court has held that "fraud by silence, 
when circumstances require honest disclosure, may constitue 
grounds for prosecution as well as false statements." 
Ballaine v. District Court,l07 Utah 247, 153 P.2d 265 at 
268 (1944). 
The State submits that the best measure of the 
theft is the full amount paid by the complainants for the 
car. This is the amount of money that the defendant 
"obtained or exercise[d] control over •.• by deception." 
Section 76-6-405. It is also an amount that reflects the 
loss of the complainant "immediately after he part[ed] 
with his property." Morris, supra. Even though the car 
was of some value, the fact remains that the complainants 
would never have purchased the car from the defendant had 
they known the true mileage on the odometer. 
-16-
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POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (SUPP. 1977) HAS 
NOT BEEN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED IN THIS CASE. 
In point three of his brief, pages 12 through 
15, the appellant raises the general argument that 
since odometer spinning has been going on for years, 
and few if any violators have been prosecuted under the 
terms of Section 76-6-405(1), that the a9pellant, while 
realizing his conduct to be illegal, did not realize that 
the punishment might be so severe. In advancing his 
argument, the appellant recognizes Section 76-1-106, but 
nevertheless calls for a strict interpretation of Section 
76-6-405{1). The appellant does not contend that the 
statute is vague on its face, but that it is vague as 
applied. 
It is without question that a statute must 
inform people of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey 
the law what conduct is not condoned. State v. Shondel, 
22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969); State v. Bateman, 
113 Ariz. 10 7, 54 7 P. 2d 6 ( 19 7 6) • 
"Void for vagueness simply 
means that criminal responsibility 
should not attach where one could not 
reasonably understand that his 
contemplated conduct is proscribed. 
In determining the sufficiency of 
the notice a statute must of necessity 
be examined in the light of the conduct 
with which a defendant is charged." 
United States v. National Dairy Products 
corp., 372 u.s. 29, 83 s.ct. 594 at 598 
(1963). 
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On the other hand, a cri~inal statute need not 
meet impossible standards of specificity, Woofter v. 
O'Donnell, 542 P.2d 1396 (Nevada 1975); nor does it need 
to specifically list every act or omission which might 
fall within its context, State v. Jones, 9 Wash.App. 1, 
511 P.2d 74, 76 (1973); United States v. Harriss, 347 
u.s. 612, 618, 74 s.ct. 808 (1954). 
The appellant would like us to believe somehow 
that by selling a used car with a turned back odometer and 
obtaining $2,830 of the victim•s property, which he would 
never have received had the victim known the true mileage, 
that the seriousness of the offense is offset by the fact 
that he could have sold the car elsewhere or by the fact 
that the victim got something for his money. The appellant 
overlooks entirely the fact that the trial court found an 
intent to defraud and that an actual fraud was committed 
(R.llO), and furthermore, that the appellant would never 
have obtained the victim's money had he not misrepresented 
the mileage (R.lll). An extension of the appellant's 
theory would argue that if a thief and the stolen property 
are both recaptured, that no crime has been committed since 
the owner has suffered no loss. 
It is safe to assume that the appellant was 
aware that his conduct was illegal. He should not be 
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permitted to attack the constitutionality of his 
conviction, merely because he underestimated the 
severity of the potential punishment. As was dis-
cussed previously in Point I of this brief, there is 
no reason to believe that the legislature in enacting 
the odometer statute desired to make it the only means 
of charging violators. Indeed, it deals only with the 
act of spinning the odometer, and not the subsequent 
sale. 
The appellant's conduct fits specifically 
into the realm of that proscriben by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405(1) (Supp. 1977), and the mere fact that he 
failed to consider the full implications of his conduct does not 
make this statute, as applied, constitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case of first impression in Utah. 
However, other jurisdictions that have considered this 
approach to the odometer spinning problem have addressed 
the issues presented by this appeal and sustained the 
convictions. The odometer statutes, Sections 41-6-176, 
et seq., and the theft by deception statute, Section 
76-6-405, are not duplicative. A conviction under 
Section 76-6-405 requires the State to meet additional 
burdens of proof, i.e., a sale of the car and a pecuniary 
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loss to the victim. Since the statutes are not duplicative, 
the rule of statutory interpretation advanced by the 
appellant is inapplicable. 
The victim in this case suffered a real pecuniary 
loss. Although he received a car that he later came to 
like, he did not receive what was pretended or bargained 
for. As a result, the appellant gained control over the 
victim's money solely on the basis of the deception he 
exercised on him. The victim would never have purchased 
the car had he known its true mileage. 
Section 76-6-405 has not been applied in an 
unconstitutional manner. The appellant knew that odometer 
spinning was illegal. His error was that he underestimat~ 
the potential severity of the crime. The statute need only 
inform people of ordinary intelligence, who desire to obey 
the law, what conduct is not condoned. The appellant's 
conduct does not indicate a desire to obey the law. 
-20-
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